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NOTES
Is Seasteading the High Seas a
Legal Possibility?
Filling the Gaps in International
Sovereignty Law and the Law of
the Seas
ABSTRACT

Seasteading-homesteadingof the modern era-is a desire
to develop above-water settlements in international waters
known as seasteads. Once a fleeting dream, seasteading has
entered the realm of possibility with the technological
advancements and financial contributions of The Seasteading
Institute (TSI). TSI's ultimate goal is ambitious: to establish
permanent seasteads as sovereign states recognized by the
United States and eventually by other members of the United
Nations. Because international law promulgated by the United
Nations addresses only state actors and TSI is a nonstate actor,
this Note argues that international law does not prohibit the
seastead communities from merely existing in international
waters before they pursue their ambitions for international
recognition. Whether a community is recognized as a sovereignty
depends in large part on sociopolitical decisions of current
nations. As such, the laws governing state sovereignty are
secondary to the public policies of various nations. Considering
historical practice and what guidance international law does
provide, this Note concludes that the United States will
recognize seasteads as envisioned by TSI in their ultimate state.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations champions the notions of self-determination
and sovereignty: the international organization operates with
"respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
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peoples."' Since the inception of the United Nations, communities on
multiple occasions have asserted their right to self-determination
primarily by emerging as sovereign, independent states.2 Even as
recently as 2011, groups of people have declared their independence 3
and have succeeded in becoming members of the United Nations. 4
The League of Nations determined that having a defined territory is
an essential element of a sovereign nation. 5 Because land is a finite
resource, sovereignty has traditionally and typically manifested itself
6
in secession from an already existing country.
The Seasteading Institute (TSI) and its members, 7 in recognizing
that land is limited, 8 believe that they have no other option but to
explore the final frontier: the international waters.9 With founder and
entrepreneur Patri Friedman at its helm, TSI plans to build
seasteads-structures that operate analogously to artificial islandsin international waters, with the eventual hope that the United

1.
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
2.
The United Nations lists three methods in which a community may assert
its right to self-determination: (1) emergence as a sovereign independent state; (2) free
association with an independent state; and (3) integration with an independent state.
See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. AIRES/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960) (describing principles
the member nations should use to determine whether there is an obligation to transmit
information under Article 73e of the Charter).
On July 9, 2011, South Sudan declared its independence. See generally
3.
Nima Elbagir & Faith Karimi, South Sudanese Celebrate the Birth of Their Nation,
CNN WORLD (July 9, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-09/world/sudan.new.
(describing the
nation 1civil-war-independence-celebrations-juba?_s=PM:WORLD
reactions of South Sudanese to independence).
The United Nations gave admission to South Sudan five days after it had
4.
declared independence. See generally Member States of the United Nations, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (listing South
Sudan as becoming a member of the United Nations on July 14, 2011).
5.
See Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (agreeing that "[t]he
state as a person of international law should possess . .. (a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the
other States").
6.
See Elbagir & Karimi, supra note 3 (describing South Sudanese
independence); Member States of the United Nations, supra note 4 (noting South
Sudan's date of admission into the United Nations).
7.
TSI is a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit, whose members are "working to
enable seasteading communities." SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/
?intro=close (last visited Dec. 15, 2012).
As Mark Twain pointed out: "Buy land, they're not making it anymore."
8.
24/7 Wall St., Memo to Congress: "Buy Land, They Ain't Making Any More of it," TIME
(Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/ 0,8599,1874407,00.html
(quoting Mark Twain) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As dictated by the UN Conventions on the Law of the Seas, international
9.
waters typically begin 224 nautical miles from a coastal country's coast. See U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Seas arts. 3, 33, 57, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (describing
the extent to which states may exercise control over territorial seas, contiguous zones,
and exclusive economic zones (EEZs)).
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Nations recognize them as independent sovereignties.' 0 TSI defines
its communities as floating cities that will "allow the next generation
of pioneers to peacefully test new ideas for government." 1 In the
wake of PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel's continuous and generous
financial contributions, TSI's envisioned dream of international
recognition is approaching a viable reality.12
There are certain characteristics that a community must possess
in order to become a sovereign and independent nation.' 3 These
factors can be distilled into two certifying criteria: (1) having
governance over a territory in which people permanently reside and
(2) being recognized as sovereign by already existing nations. 14 This
Note addresses the second factor: namely, whether the United States
and, ultimately, the United Nations, would recognize TSI's
seasteads.15
This Note subdivides this issue into three distinct questions: (1)
where and under what circumstances would TSI's seasteads be able
to operate free of intervention from the United States,
notwithstanding their ambition for sovereignty; 16 (2) whether the
United States would recognize the communities; and lastly, (3)
whether the United Nations would come to recognize them.
Recognition by the United States is a prerequisite for recognition by
the United Nations.' 7 However, as this Note explains, being
recognized as sovereign by current nation-states is mostly a
sociopolitical decision and less a legal one. Accordingly, separating
questions (2) and (3) offers a comparison between the American

10.
See Press Release, The Seasteading Inst. [TSI], Introducing The
Seasteading Institute (Apr. 14, 2008), available at http://www.seasteading.org/
2008/04/introducing-the-seasteading-institute/ (describing the goal of TSI to use
seasteading to allow people to choose their government).
11.
Vision/Strategy, THE SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/about/
visionstrategy/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
12.
By August of 2011, Thiel had contributed a total of $1.75 million. He
donated $500,000 in April 2008 at the inception of TSI, and most recently pledged an
additional $1.25 million in August 2011. See Liz Goodwin, Silicon Valley Billionaire
Funding Creation of Artificial Libertarian Islands, YAHOO NEWS! (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/lookout/silicon-valley-billionaire-funding-creationartificial-libertarian-islands-140840896.html (describing Thiel's investment in and
plans for TSI).
See Montevideo Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1-11 (describing agreed
13.
upon characteristics of sovereign statehood).
14.
Id.
As of now, the seastead communities do not exist. While TSI believes that
15.
the communities will be a financial and technical possibility, this Note engages in a
thought experiment of were they to exist, would the seastead communities face legal
barriers?
16.
In reality, seasteads will seek recognition from all nations. However, this
Note will analyze the topic with respect to the United States, notably because the first
seastead will operate in its primary phase in U.S. jurisdictional waters.
17.
See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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perspective and the non-American perspective.' 8 The combination of
international law, historical cases, and recent examples of state
practice can provide an answer as to the legal obstacles TSI's
seasteads would face, if any.19
Part II expands on TSI: in particular, the concept of seasteading
as engendered by TSI, the goals of TSI, and the structural and
functional implications of creating seasteads. These details illustrate
which legal, social, and political issues are triggered. Part III
analyzes the body of international law of the seas as established by
the United Nations, with respect to the actions of a nonstate actor.
Specifically, Part III discusses in which circumstances and under
what assumptions current nations can interfere, if at all, with the
operations of seasteads acting as nonstate actors. Part IV explains
the United Nations' perspectives on state sovereignty and selfdetermination, and concludes that the TSI seasteads will meet the
preliminary requirements of becoming a nation-having governance
over a territory in which people reside. Part V discusses the ultimate
and dispositive criterion: whether current nations will recognize the
TSI seasteads as sovereignties. This Note extrapolates from historical
and modern examples of nonstate actors acting independently from
the United States and from members of the European community,
concluding that the United States is most likely to recognize the
seasteads as sovereign nations.

II. THE SEASTEADING INSTITUTE (TSI) AND THE CONCEPT
OF SEASTEADING

TSI has transformed seasteading from a lofty dream dating to
the middle of the twentieth century into a realistic endeavor of
current times. At the forefront of this progress, TSI envisions its
ocean communities to be not only nexuses for political reform and
governmental development, but also independent sovereigns
recognized by the international community.

18.
Moreover, TSI refers to acceptance by the international community and the
United Nations at large and does not reference any specific countries in particular.
However, this Note will divide recognition by the United States from that by the
United Nations for two reasons: (1) the former is a precondition to the latter, and (2)
the United States may have a particular interest (TSI's seasteads will operate closest
to the U.S. coasts and its members are hoping to break free from the United States).
19.
Of course, there may still be ultimate economic and technological barriers
that could permanently preclude seasteading from becoming a reality. However, this
Note does not take these economic and technological factors into consideration, and
instead focuses on the pertinent and normative legal issues.
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A. Seasteadingas a HistoricalConcept, Giving Birth to TSI
Given the many failed attempts at seasteading in the second half
of the twentieth century, it is difficult to accept that TSI's ocean
communities are physically and financially possible. The 1960s saw
Operation Atlantis, whose founder, Werner Steifel, was unsuccessful
on numerous occasions. 20 In 1971, wealthy libertarian Michael Oliver
created the Republic of Minerva by unloading barrels of sand on coral
reefs; however, his short-lived Republic eroded into the ocean. 21 More
recently in 1993, the Oceania City project developed but was shortly
abandoned due to inadequate funds and lack of interest.2 2
Upon discovering the Oceania City website, software engineer
Wayne Gramlich wrote a "modest proposal": the 1998 treatise
SeaSteading-Homestead on the High Seas.23 Gramlich writes that
although he would be "delighted" if proven wrong, he believes that
fanciful projects will never be realized because they are unrealistic
and too extreme. 24 Instead, he posited a somewhat primitive and
simplistic "floatation method."25 Upon seeing this proposal, Patri
Friedman-TSI's founder-contacted Gramlich, and the two
collaborated in writing Seasteading: A Practical Guide to
Homesteading the High Seas.26 This became the foundational
document of TSI.27 As a response to those failed grandiose attempts,

20.
Stiefel spent a substantial portion of his life attempting to create a
sovereign society with free markets: he built a ferro-cement boat that made one
successful trip on New York and New Jersey's Hudson River; he constructed a system
of seabreaks off the coast of Haiti that was ultimately ejected by then-president
Frangois Duvalier's gunboats; lastly, he purchased an oil rig and placed it in the
Caribbean Sea where it was decimated by a storm. See Chris Baker, Live Free or
Drown: Floating Utopias on the Cheap, WIRED MAG.
(Jan. 19, 2009),
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/magazine/17-02/mf-seasteading?currentPage=all
(describing several failed seasteading projects).
21.
See id. ("Minerva was soon invaded by the nearby kingdom of Tonga, and it
dissolved back into the ocean shortly thereafter.").
22.
See id. (Founder Eric Klien noted that "[tihe Libertarian party is small in
number and too few members have the financial resources to bankroll their beliefs").
23.
Id.
24.
Wayne C. Gramlich, SeaSteading-Hornesteading the High Seas,
GRAMLICH.NET, http://gramlich.net/projects/oceanialseasteadl.html (last visited Apr.
11, 2013).
25.
Gramlich's concept involved using thousands of recycled two-liter plastic
beverage bottles as the foundation for a floating nation. Baker, supra note 20.
26.
See id. (describing Friedman's dissatisfaction with more "fantastical"
projects and excitement at discovering Gramlich's practical ideas).
27.
See PATRI FRIEDMAN & WAYNE GRAMLICH, SEASTEADING: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO HOMESTEADING THE HIGH SEAS 2 (June 9, 2009), available at
http://seasteading.wpengine.netdna-cdn.comlwp-content/uploads/2012/03/full book beta.pdf
(describing how Friedman and Gramlich's ideas led Thiel to invest $500,000 to begin the
nonprofit TSI).

20131

IS SEASTEADING THE HIGH SEAS A LEGAL POSSIBILITY?

905

TSI retains a realistic attitude as it approaches this enigmatic final
frontier. 2 8

B. Motivations and Goals of TSI Seasteading
TSI's ultimate goal is two-fold: (1) to build artificial islands in
international waters for the purposes of experimenting with new
forms of government, regulation, and societal norms;2 9 and (2) to have
these islands recognized by the international community as sovereign
states.30 Friedman and his fellow "seasteaders" view the political
system of the United States as irreparably damaged.3 1 Rather than
trying to effect change from the inside, TSI hopes to offer a better
solution on the outside.32
TSI cites the response of the United States to two events-the
attacks of September 11th (9/11) and the financial crisis of 2008
(Financial Crisis)-as the driving impetus to create seastead
communities.3 3 TSI states that the tragedy greater than the actual
9/11 attacks and the Financial Crisis was ultimately how the United
States responded. 34 According to TSI, in the post-9/11 era,
overzealous right-wing patriotism dominated the political arena to
the point of "exclud[ing]" dissent and taking away "freedoms and civil
liberties . . . in the name of protection."35 These freedoms allow the

United States to be "a better place to live," and TSI believes that the
United States "lost [its] way as a nation" in the fight against
terrorism. 36 Moreover, TSI posits that the stimulus plan, as a
response to the Financial Crisis, is a "massive waste" that was
"actually harmful to recovery"; specifically, "high taxes,

. .

. inflation,

[and] capital controls" will make the country a far worse place in the
eyes of Friedman. 37 TSI argues that the drastic diminishment of
economic and social liberties in the past decade-a "truly dark"

28.
"Far from being dreamy-eyed utopians, we are serious planners with
realistic principles for bringing this strange vision to life. This realism dictates an
incremental approach, modest political goals, reliance on mature technology, selffinancing, and a willingness to make compromises." Id.
29.
See FAQ, THE SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/about/faq/
(last visited Apr. 11, 2013) (addressing questions about the "[v]ision, [m]ission, and
[g]oals" of seasteading).
30.
See id. (addressing questions about the "[a]utonomy and [slustainability" of
seasteads).
31.
See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
32.
See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
33.
See FRIEDMAN & GRAMLICH, supra note 27, at 16-18 ("[Ilt has been a truly
dark decade. The need for a new frontier and new ways of organizing a society has
never been more urgent.").
34.
See id. (describing the responses of the United States to both events as
"counterproductive").
Id. at 16.
35.
36.
See id. at 16-17.
See id. at 17.
37.
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time-is a motivating factor in its goal of pursuing seasteading
communities. 3 8
Whether or not one agrees with TSI and Friedman's
aforementioned opinions, the logical response is to ask the following:
why not change the status quo by attempting to elect officials who
share these concerns? TSI readily admits that the public sector is in
"vital need" of change.39 However, according to TSI, the political
system is not amenable to change from within for several reasons.
Firstly, neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican Party is
ideal: both reacted independently and inadequately in the past
decade. 40 Moreover, TSI deems the public sector to have a "barrier to
entry" for new participants, 41 who feel "alienated" and believe that
modern democratic governments "are often unresponsive to the needs
of their citizens." 4 2 Lastly, TSI believes that the only way to enter the
public sector would be via "violent revolutions or coups," an option
that TSI clearly will not pursue. 43 For these reasons, TSI and its
members believe that seasteading is the only viable option to achieve
their goals.
1.

Goal 1: Experimenting with New Forms of Government

Seasteading will enable individuals of various nations to escape
"oppressive governments," thereby giving them "freedom to choose" a
system of laws they desire, as opposed to being trapped by the
government of their respective country. 44 Seasteads will create
governments that allow for social and economic liberties, the
"combination of which rarely exists in any permanent form." 45

See id. at 17-18 (noting the urgency of the need for "new ways of organizing
38.
a society").
See Press Release, TSI, supra note 10 ("[T]he Seasteading Institute will
39.
help bring more of that innovation to the public sector, where it's vitally needed.").
"Two very different crises. Two somewhat different political parties. Two
40.
horribly counterproductive responses, each wrecking what they claimed to be saving."
FRIEDMAN & GRAMLICH, supra note 27, at 17.

41.
See Press Release, TSI, supra note 10.
See Press Release, TSI, Vote with Your House (Aug. 18, 2008), available at
42.
http://www.seasteading.org/ 2008/09/vote-with-your-house/.
43.
FAQ, supra note 29.
44.
Press Release, TSI, supra note 10; FAQ, supra note 29.
45.
See FRIEDMAN & GRAMLICH, supra note 27, at 86. Instead of abstract
concepts, Gramlich cites specific examples to illustrate his desire that seasteads will
embody the best of all governments. For instance, Switzerland is rather relaxed with
respect to drug policy and enforcement (social liberties), and Monaco is a tax haven for
those fortunate to gain citizenship with the principality (economic liberties). However,
Switzerland is fiscally conservative and Monaco is socially conservative. Gramlich
hopes to have a community and a new form of government that embraces both forms of
libertarianism.
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By "experiment[ing] with... legal systems," seasteading will
develop "more efficient, practical public sector models." 46 Essentially,
TSI sees seasteading as a survival-of-the-fittest, choice-of-legalregime competition. If seasteads were to exist, dissatisfied citizens
would leave their own countries for the seasteads. This theoretically
would incentivize the governments of these abandoned nations to
adapt and evolve so that they can retain their citizenry; otherwise,
these countries would lose out to the seasteading communities. 47
Friedman sees this as a return to the lost roots of the U.S.
government: the Founding Fathers "intended for the states to be
laboratories of democracy, experimenting with different laws to
compete for citizens. But so much power has been centralized by the
federal government that now states have very little freedom to
experiment." 48 The seasteaders believe that their cities will restore
that competition: "[I]magine the reduction in worldwide violence if
Israel could just move away from Palestine, Georgia from Russia, or
Hong Kong from China. On floating cities, this is actually possible!"49
In this way, the seastead governmental system may perpetually
evolve. Acting as the "world's first political [research and
development department]-a kind of incubator for governments,"5 0
TSI seasteads will purportedly lead to the forms of government best
suited for their citizens, as determined by them through this forced
choice-of-government-regime competition.si
2.

Goal 2: Gaining Recognition as an Independent Nation by the
International Community

Several characteristics of seasteads in their final form trigger
certain legal implications. 52 In terms of structural design, TSI
envisions that these communities will be anchored to the seabed
using steel or concrete pillars, with a flat platform suspended above
water to provide for living space.53 The consequence of this conscious

46.
Press Release, TSI, supra note 10.
47.
See FAQ, supra note 29 ("Competition from new nations will incentivize old
nations to adapt and evolve-or lose out to these new nations.").
48.
Press Release, TSI, supra note 42.
49.
"Modern democratic governments are often unresponsive to the needs of
their citizens. Our floating cities will change that-if you don't like your government,
you'll be able to pull up anchor and sail to a better one, or start your own." Id.
50.
FAQ, supra note 29.
51.
See Press Release, TSI, supra note 10 ("By making it safe and affordable to
settle this frontier, we will give people the freedom to choose the government they want
instead of being stuck with the government they get.").
52.
Economic factors weigh heavily into the determination of whether
seasteading is a realistic possibility for obvious reasons; however, this Note does not
discuss this consideration heavily. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
53.
See FRIEDMAN & GRAMLICH, supra note 27, at 122 (describing a "tension leg
platform" that would combine features of a stationary platform with pillars on the
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architectural design-being fixed to the seabed, as opposed to floating
above-is that seasteads will operate as artificial islands and not as
sea-faring vessels, which dictates the applicable law. Generally
speaking, vessels include "all navigable structures intended for
transportation," 54 and the primary purpose of TSI's seasteads is not
for transportation.5 5
Moreover, the daily operations of seasteads have certain legal
ramifications. TSI anticipates that its communities will take
advantage of their location in the high seas by harnessing wind and
solar energy, 56 as well as engaging in the fishing and mining
industries to trade for goods that can be produced more efficiently
elsewhere.5 7 Moreover, TSI knows that while initial participation
may be temporary, seasteads eventually will become permanent
residences for their members.5 8 These steps towards selfsustainability speak to the fact that seasteading will necessarily use
resources of the seas, implicating certain regulations and laws.
Lastly, there are economic considerations that factor into whether
seasteading is realistically possible. To date, TSI's largest
contributions have accounted for 2 percent of its expected costs. 5 9 If
the initial prototype were fully occupied, it would sell at $311 per
square foot, which is comparable to average prices for homes in
Manhattan, which may be cost prohibitive. 60 While these financial
factors do not have any bearing on whether it is a legal possibility,
they certainly have normative implications.

ocean floor with features of more mobile floating designs); Baker, supra note 20
(diagramming one potential design for a seastead).
54.
Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 629, 629 (1997) (emphasis added);
see also Stewart v. Dustra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2005).
55.
Although TSI will use a modular platform-in the sense that various parts
of the platform will be able to move-the seastead as a single platform will be stationed
on the seabed. See FAQ, supra note 29 (noting that modular platforms allow
seasteaders the freedom to relocate to a different seastead while noting the long-term
goal of "larger, less mobile designs").
56.
See Press Release, TSI, supra note 42 (noting the potential for a smaller
carbon footprint than in land-based cities).
57.
For instance, it would be more efficient to import beef and other meat
products, as opposed to raising cattle on the seastead. See FAQ, supra note 29
(describing the potential industries seasteaders might enter and how food import
patterns will likely evolve as seasteads become more adept at farming).
See id. (noting that "[m]ost early-adopters will live at sea part time, basing
58.
either their business life or vacation life there, but frequently returning to shore").
59.
See id. (describing a $2 million donation where the costs of one prototype
seastead were in excess of $100 million).
60.
TSI estimates that in order to build a long-term seastead, it would need
nearly $100 million in financial contributions. See id. It therefore plans to proceed in
"self-financing, incremental steps." See id. TSI's largest contributions have come from
Theil, who has donated under $2 million, which is significantly lower than the
estimated minimum. See Goodwin, supra note 12 (noting Thiel's recent $1.25 million
donation).
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In order to achieve political freedom and legal autonomy, TSI
envisions a process that goes through distinct and gradual phases.6 1
The first seastead communities would operate closely off the coast of
California. Under this initial stage, the seasteads would manage
themselves under the maritime laws as existing ships, registering
with a nation for use of its flag and thereby availing themselves to
the maritime laws of that country. 62 Once the engineers at TSI are
able to construct the aforementioned model of a platform sitting atop
columns and develop ways to withstand harsh ocean conditions, TSI
will move its seasteads outwards to international waters to escape
the jurisdictional grasp of coastal nations.63 While furthering this
technological progress and moving outwards, TSI hopes that its
seasteads will enhance their reputation among the international
community, create tentative alliances, and then negotiate official
treaties with other nations. 64 Finally, with enough mutual respect
and dialogue between seasteads and current nations, TSI will pursue
its goal of "recognition from the United Nations, and ultimately
recognized sovereignty."6 5
This Note focuses on the concept of the TSI seasteads in their
final form: as self-sufficient artificial islands in international waters,
hoping to gain recognition by the international community. This Note
overlooks seasteading in its primary phase for two reasons. Firstly,
TSI hopes to progress past this stage; accordingly, an analysis of this
temporary period is not as valuable as one of its final form.6 6
Secondly, in this initial period there is very little legal uncertainty as
to TSI's duties and obligations: the initial seastead would be governed
as an anchored ship under the norms of maritime law, within the
territorial seas of the United States. 6 7
Interestingly, TSI is not concerned about legal barriers. Though
Gramlich in 2002 stated that the "tangled morass" of international

See FAQ, supra note 29 ("When there are enough seasteaders-as well as
61.
mutual respect among the various seasteads and major world powers-seasteads are
likely to seek recognition from the United Nations, and ultimately recognized
sovereignty.").
62.
See id. ("In the interim, seasteads will first operate using so-called 'flags of
convenience' from countries with open flag registries.").
63.
See id. (noting that "[elven unoccupied islands are the territory of various
countries' Exclusive Economic Zones, in which countries exercise valuable rights over
fishing and mineral resources").
64.
See id. ("Eventually seasteads will create alliances and negotiate treaties
with other nations.").
Id.
65.
66.
Admittedly, whether or not seasteading will ever progress to the final stage
hinges on whether it will pass muster under the initial incremental phases.
67.
This Note will not address the duties and obligations of the TSI seastead
community sailing under the flag of an already existing nation primarily because TSI's
eventual goal is to exist as an artificial island, not as a vessel, and the applicability and
implications of maritime law do not affect TSI communities in this ultimate form.
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maritime and state sovereignty law is a "[great] concern,"68 TSI
suggests to its lay audience that very few legal hurdles, if any, exist.
Only the "ambitions of community and funding"-in other words, the
psychological willingness and financial capabilities-"might stop
[seasteading] from happening."6 9 More explicitly, TSI forthrightly
states that "international law [will not] pose a significant threat."70
Accordingly, this Note will address the following points: (1)
whether the United States and other countries would be able to
prevent the activities of the TSI seasteads in international waters, as
those of nonstate actors, even before they hope to achieve sovereign
recognition; (2) whether the United States would recognize the final
vision of the seasteads as independent nations; and (3) whether the
United Nations would give admission to the seasteads as envisioned
by TSI.
III. ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS CREATED BY
NONSTATE ACTORS

International law has not directly contemplated the concept of
the archetypal seasteading community: nonstate actors building
artificial islands as permanent settlements in international waters.7 1
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) outlines the three main
sources of international law:. (1) international conventions and
treaties that establish recognized rules of law; (2) international
custom, evidenced by common practice and accepted as law; and (3)
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.7 2 The ICJ
considers several secondary sources-"judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists"-as ancillary means
for determining and distilling the aforementioned rules of law. 73
The treatises applicable to seasteading are the 1958 UN
Convention of the High Seas (Geneva Convention) 74 and its successor,

FRIEDMAN & GRAMLICH, supra note 27, at 4.
68.
69.
FAQ, supra note 29.
70.
Id.
71.
Part III addresses the actions of TSI-building artificial islands in the
water, initially near the coast of the United States and then ultimately in international
waters-notwithstanding the desire to gain recognition, and in what situations the
United States can exercise control over the seasteads. Self-determination and
sovereignty are addressed in Part IV and Part V.
72.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 22
U.N.T.S 993 (providing what law the ICJ will apply when making a determination on
an international dispute).
73.
Id. art. 38(d).
74.
See United Nations Convention of the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] (limiting the rights of states to subject
the high seas to their sovereignty).
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the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).75 There
have been a few situations in which independent nonstate actors have
attempted to operate solely in the oceans. These cases can be treated
as customary law: what a nonstate actor has done in the past and
how then-existing countries have reacted in these scenarios may very
well illustrate how those nations would react in the future to a
similar situation. 76 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(the Tribunal) is the judiciary body that would hear any applicable
dispute, as the Tribunal was created by UNCLOS to arbitrate any
controversies arising under the Geneva Convention or UNCLOS. 7 7
However, the Tribunal has only heard twenty cases thus far, and
none relate directly or indirectly to seasteading.78
A. The Law of the Seas
International treaty law, and in particular the Geneva
Convention and UNCLOS, delineates obligations by which state
actors must abide. As such, these bodies of rules dictate whether and
to what extent countries may interfere with the actions of TSI as a
nonstate actor operating in international waters. As a corollary to
this limited applicability of international treaty law, this Note takes
into consideration comparable examples in which nonstate actors
operated as artificial islands in the waters of nearby countries.
Specifically, this Note looks at cases of pirate radio stations, a
community of leisure activities, and most similarly, an attempt to
create a sovereign nation on a sunken ship. The confluence of these
varying sources strongly suggests that as between the United States
and members of the European Union, the former would be more
willing to accept the concept of seasteading as TSI envisions.
1.

International Treaty Law

International treaty law as promulgated by the United Nations
does not speak directly to whether TSI is prohibited or permitted to
build artificial islands in international waters: international law
governs actions between member states of the United Nations, and
TSI is a nonstate actor. While the applicable statutes do not forbid

75.
See UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 60 (covering artificial islands).
76.
See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the four relevant cases about
artificial islands.
77.
"The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is an independent
judicial body established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
[UNCLOS] to adjudicate disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of
the Convention." See The Tribunal, INT'L TRIBUNAL L. SEA, http://www.itlos.org/
index.php?id= 15&L=0 (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
78.
For a listing of all the cases, see List of Cases, INT'L TRIBUNAL L. SEA,
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=35 (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
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nonstate actors from establishing sovereignty over international
waters, they do not explicitly allow it either. The Geneva Convention
and UNCLOS establish rules that govern the international waters in
which TSI plans to eventually establish its seasteads. While the
United States has not ratified UNCLOS, its bases for opposition are
unrelated to seasteading.7 9 Accordingly, this Note assumes that the
United States does not disagree with, and would in fact apply,
UNCLOS particulars that are relevant to seasteading. The Geneva
Convention claims:
[N]o State may validly purport to subject any part of [the high seas] to
its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of
international law. ...

These freedoms, and others which are recognized by general principles
of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
80
the high seas.

This articulation does not explicitly preclude TSI from building
artificial islands in international waters; the Geneva Convention
applies only to state actors.8 1 Because the Geneva Convention is not
per se preclusive, it facially permits a nonstate actor such as the TSI
to build its seasteads in international waters.
However, a closer reading suggests that TSI's communities may
encounter two problems if they attempt to pursue sovereign
recognition by the United States and by the United Nations. That a
state cannot subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty-to
colonize-does not necessarily imply the freedom of a nonstate actor
to do so. This assumption does not inevitably follow merely because
the Geneva Convention does not explicitly speak to nonstate actors.
Additionally, if TSI were to petition for recognition by the
international community, the artificial island would effectively be
subjected to sovereignty, which is prohibited.
UNCLOS is equally silent on whether a nonstate actor can
create artificial islands in international waters.82 However, UNCLOS

79.
See Rene Kardol, Proposed Inhabited Artificial Islands in International
Waters: International Law Analysis in Regards to Resource Use, Law of the Sea and
Norms of Self-Determination and State Recognition § 3.1.2 (Mar. 1999) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Amsterdam), available at http://seasteading.wpengine.
netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02fProposed-Inhabited-Artificial-Islands-inInternational-Waters.pdf (explaining the five points of opposition that the United
States had with UNCLOS).
80.
Geneva Convention, supra note 74, art. 2.
81.
See id. (use of the term State throughout the text of the article provides
evidence that the Convention is applicable only to states).
82.
As with the Geneva Convention, UNCLOS governs the relationships
between states and does not speak to what nonstate actors may do. See UNCLOS, supra
note 9, art. 2 (defining the legal status of territorial seas in terms of states).
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theoretically gives the seasteads the freedom to act as they wish in
these waters, by continuing to engender the notion that only states
cannot subject the high seas to their control.8 3 Moreover, UNCLOS
defines the various zones of waters over which coastal nations such as
the United States can exert jurisdiction, and TSI will only be entirely
free from U.S. control if it is more than 224 nautical miles off the
coast of the United States.
i.

The Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, and the Exclusive
Economic Zone

The territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles from the
baseline of a nation's coast,84 and the United States' sovereignty
extends to the "air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed
and subsoil."85 The contiguous zone stretches from the edge of the
territorial sea outwards another twelve nautical miles.8 6 Here, the
United States is allowed to exert limited control for two purposes: (1)
to prevent the infringement of "customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary laws and regulations" and (2) to punish such infringement.8 7
Even if seasteads were not recognized as sovereignties, merely
establishing their own form of self-rule in contravention to the mores
of the United States would give the United States jurisdiction over
them; as such, being within either the territorial seas or the
contiguous zone are the least desirable locations for TSI's seasteads.
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends from the outer edge
of the contiguous zone up to 200 nautical miles, for a total of 224
miles from a country's coastline.8 8 In the EEZ, the United States has
"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources."8 9 These resources
include the "living [and] non-living," as well as the "sea-bed and its
subsoil."90 Moreover, the United States has sovereign rights with
respect to "economic exploitation" of the EEZ,9 1 which include
harnessing energy from wind and water sources.92 Despite these

83.
See id. (regarding the UNCLOS prohibition of a state subjecting the high
seas to its domain).
Id. art. 3.
84.
85.
See id. art. 2(2) (providing parties to the convention rights to the air and
sea floor adjacent to their territorial sea).
86.
See id. art. 33(2) (explaining that the territorial zone and the zone
contiguous to the territorial zone shall not be greater than twenty-four nautical miles
from the same baseline from which the territorial zone was measured).
87.
Id. art. 33(1).
See id. art. 57 (limiting the EEZ to two hundred nautical miles from the
88.
baseline).
Id. art. 56.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
92.
See id. (providing examples of permissible economic exploitation).
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limitations, all states enjoy the freedoms of "navigation and
overflight" in the EEZ of any country.9 3 In other words, the vessel of
another country has the right to navigate and loiter on the surface
within the EEZ of the United States. Most importantly, UNCLOS
speaks directly to artificial islands in the EEZ: the United States has
the "exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the
construction, operation, and use of artificial islands."94 For these
reasons, it would also be undesirable for TSI as it hopes to create its
communities operating within the EEZ of the United States. 95
If TSI were to operate solely in the EEZ, seasteads would be
successful only under the following criteria: (1) if they are ships or
freely floating platforms; (2) if they are not engaged in any type of
resource extraction; and (3) if they are not harnessing energy from
water, wind, or solar sources. Only if TSI satisfied these three
qualifications would the United States be unable to interfere in its
operations. However, to be self-sufficient, TSI seasteads envision
precisely these uses of natural resources. Also, the seasteads would
never be built or used in such a way that they will be considered shipfaring vessels. As such, although the communities could exist in this
limited capacity, for practical purposes, they would not.9 6
ii.

International Waters

International waters extend from the limit of the EEZ outwards:
anywhere past 224 nautical miles from the United States' coast and
until the EEZ of the next coastal country.97 The high seas "are open
to all States,"9 8 and the United Nations here again affirms the maxim
that "no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas
to its sovereignty."9 9 If TSI were to operate in international waters,
then the seasteads would necessarily have to argue that as a nonstate
actor, TSI is not restricted by the Geneva Convention or UNCLOS.
Because it is a nonstate actor, TSI would categorically and
necessarily not be violating the mandate that no state may purport to
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. The relevant UN
treatises neither prohibit nor sanction a nonstate actor from pursuing
statehood in international waters. TSI would posit that not being

93.
Id. art. 58.
94.
Id. art. 60(1) (emphasis added).
95.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (laying out criteria that could
prevent seasteading from taking place within the U.S. EEZ).
96.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (arguing that a seastead could be
self-sustaining in the future).
97.
See UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 86 (stating that Part VII of UNCLOS
applies to all parts of the sea that are not covered by the terms EEZ, territorial sea, or
internal water).
Id. art. 87.
98.
99.
Id. art. 89 (repeating Article 2 of the Geneva Convention).
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precluded is essentially the same as being allowed; however, this
argument has no legal foundation.
Ultimately, whether the seasteads may petition for sovereignty
as artificial islands in international waters is not to be decided by
legal treatises. TSI is a nonstate actor, and neither the Geneva
Convention nor UNCLOS governs nonstate actors. Instead of focusing
solely on the body of international law, this Note's scope includes the
following historical cases, which speak more concretely to whether
TSI's communities are going to meet opposition.
2.

Cases of Artificial Islands

While international treaty law as established by the United
Nations does not directly address the legal possibility of TSI's
seasteads, there have been four situations-one in the Netherlands,
one in the United Kingdom, and two in the United States-that
indicate the United States is potentially less opposed than the
European community to recognizing the rights and activities of
nonstate actors in the formation of artificial islands.
In 1964, Reclame Exploitatite Maatschappij (REM) operated as a
pirate radio station six miles off the coast of the Netherlands.100 The
station, which was the property of non-Dutch citizens but operated by
a private Dutch company, was not within the jurisdiction of the
Netherlands because it predated UNCLOS and its establishment of
territorial waters. 10 ' The Netherlands was interested in regulating
the operations of REM because it had been interfering with stateapproved radio stations and communications between ships, and the
station had also been evading taxes.102 In response to REM's actions,
the Dutch government proposed and passed the North Sea
Installations Act, which allowed the country to exercise jurisdiction
over all installations erected on its continental shelf, no matter for
what purpose.' 0 3 The government held that REM, as a nonmovable

100.
See NIKOS PAPADAKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF ARTIFICIAL
ISLANDS 35 (1977) (introducing pirate broadcasting stations as an issue that has
developed in the last fifty years). Reclame exploitatite maatschappig is Dutch for
"advertising exploitation company."
101.
UNCLOS was opened for signature on December 10, 1982, and was entered
into force more than a decade later on November 16, 1994 upon deposition of the
sixtieth instrument of ratification. See The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (A Historical Perspectivel, UNITED NATIONS DIVISION OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention-historical-perspective.
htm.
See Papadakis, supra note 100 (discussing the interests nation-states had
102.
in pirate broadcast stations due to the adverse ramifications the nation-states
suffered).
See id. at 150 (explaining that the scope of the North Sea Installation Act
103.
extends further than would have been necessary to shut down the pirate broadcasts in
that it covers all fixed installations).
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installation mounted on piers that rested on the seabed, was within
the new legislation's scope. As such, REM was immediately shut
down.104

In the same year, Radio Caroline operated off the coast of the
United Kingdom, for the purpose of evading BBC Radio and the
recording industry's control over broadcasting. 105 The United
Kingdom did not take immediate action as the Netherlands did; the
country was reluctant to interfere with the freedoms of the high seas
and believed that scenarios such as this should be addressed only
through international agreements.1 06 As a result, the Council of
Europe established the Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts
Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories (the
European Agreement) in 1965.107 The European Agreement made
punishable the "establishment or operation of broadcasting
stations,"10 8 and contracting states applied the law to both "nationals"
as well as "non-nationals."109 While the European Agreement did not
speak directly to artificial islands or installations fixed to the seabed
similar or analogous to TSI's seasteads, it explicitly stipulated that
nothing in the agreement shall prevent parties from applying its
provisions to such fixtures.110 Upon its enactment, the European
Agreement ended Radio Caroline's operations.
In 1967, the Atlantis Development Corporation (Atlantis Group)
attempted to build on several coral reefs, all within a range of 4.5-10

104.
See id. at 101 (noting that because the government considered REM to be
an artificial island, it was found to be a fixed installation rather than a ship, bringing it
within the scope of the act).
105.
See PAUL HARRIS, BROADCASTING FROM THE HIGH SEAS: THE HISTORY OF
OFFSHORE RADIO IN EUROPE 1958-1976, at 10 (1977) (stating that the idea for Radio
Caroline formed when O'Rahilly, a music agent, could not get anyone interested in his
singer since he was not part of the big four record companies).
106.
See id. at 26 (finding that the Post Master General's step back from
immediate enforcement was informed by his belief that action should be taken by all of
Europe's nations, rather than by the United Kingdom alone).
107.
See id. at 27 (responding to the dangers of pirate radio, the seventeen
member countries of the Council of Europe aimed to eliminate transmitting radio
stations at sea).
108.
European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from
Stations Outside National Territories art. 2, Jan. 22, 1965, E.T.S. No. 53.
109.
Id. art. 3.
110.

Id. art. 4.

Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to prevent a Contracting
Party: (a) from also treating as punishable offences acts other than
those referred to in Article 2 and also applying the provisions
concerned to persons other than those referred to in Article 3; (b) from
also applying the provisions of this Agreement to broadcasting stations
installed or maintained on objects affixed to or supported by the bed of
the sea.
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Atlantis Group had hoped to
miles off the coast of Florida.'
construct facilities for a variety of leisure activities, including a hotel,
casino, marina, and fishing club.11 2 When Atlantis Group initiated its
construction plans, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers asserted that
permission was needed to erect certain structures on two of the
reefs.' 1 3 Invoking authority under the U.S. Code, 1 14 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that no construction could be
undertaken in the "navigable waters" of the United States without
the approval of the Department of the Army, whose authority
"extended to artificial islands and fixed structures located upon the
Outer Continental Shelf.""15 Because the attempted structures were
located within the 224 nautical mile zone, Atlantis Group's proposal
sat within the United States' jurisdictional waters. Accordingly, the
U.S Army Corps of Engineers denied Atlantis Group permission to
continue its project, on the basis that it would be a hazard for
navigation purposes.116
In 1969, the USS Abalonia planned to anchor itself with cement
to the Cortes Bank and to create a new state called Abalonia.11 7 The
Cortes Bank-a seamount that is one hundred miles off the coast of
San Diego-was rich in shellfish, and the company would station
there, put a processing plant on the boat, and harvest the largely
untapped resources of the area.1 18 However, shortly after its maiden
voyage, the USS Abalonia sank." 9 Afterwards, a second company
began similar plans in the hopes of declaring itself the nation of
Taluga, and would position itself above the sunken ship.120
Immediately, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers gave notice that the
new project would be a hazard for purposes of navigation-the same
reason for which Atlantis Group's proposal was rejected.121

111.
See Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1967)
(presenting the crux of the case to be about control rights to coral reef discoveries).
See id. (describing the "discovery" of the reefs and what William Anderson
112.
had hoped to do with them).
See id. at 821 (requiring the Atlantis group to attempt to persuade the U.S.
113.
Army Corps of Engineers that the reefs were not within the United States'
jurisdiction).
See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006) ("The creation of any obstruction not
114.
affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of
the United States is hereby prohibited.").
See Atlantis, 379 F.2d at 827.
115.
See id. at 821 (stating that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers required
116.
permits, which were not granted, to erect structures on the reefs).
See PAPADAKIS, supra note 100, at 36 (providing Abalonia as an example of
117.
companies that have attempted to create independent states for commercial benefits).
See id. (providing commercial reasons why the company desired to form a
118.
new sovereign island state).
See id. (finding that the plan failed in part due to the sinking of the base of
119.
the new "state").
120.
See id. at 36 n.130 (describing the effort to construct four islands on the
Cortes Bank).
See id. at 36 (noting the response from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
121.
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Reaffirming its previous position, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
declared that the Cortes Bank was a part of the outer continental
shelf and under the jurisdiction of the United States, and prohibited
the Taluga project from developing. 2 2
3.

Analysis

These cases suggest that the United States would be welcoming
toward TSI's anticipated project. In the Netherlands, REM had
operated in a legal vacuum where its existence was neither prohibited.
nor sanctioned, yet the government's reaction of creating new
legislation solely to subject REM to the Netherlands' jurisdictional
control is especially indicative of one point of view. The function and
purpose of an artificial island are dispositive in assessing whether a
country will accept and allow for its existence. REM had two
purposes: to escape licensing and taxation laws, and also to be able to
broadcast radio signals to the people of the Netherlands. These
endeavors precipitated the Netherlands to take matters into its own
hands. In response to Radio Caroline, a pirate radio station that
operated almost identically to REM, the British government
successfully encouraged the international community to exert control.
While the Dutch and the British governments both recognized that
there existed a legal vacuum in international law with respect to
artificial islands, the two countries reacted in different manners: the
Netherlands saw that it was its own responsibility to enact regulatory
laws, whereas Britain waited for the European Agreement, albeit by
enacting the very same type of regulations. Despite divergent
approaches, the same outcome resulted: new legislation applied
retroactively to make radio stations illegal. Extrapolating from the
1960s to the present day, members of the European Union could
realistically enact regulations to police and prohibit the behavior of
TSI's seasteads.
On the other hand, the United States' response to both the
Atlantis Group and the Cortes Bank developments was not focused on
the regulation of interfering activities. Instead, the government's
concerns were the unauthorized use of state property-since both
developments were on the outer continental shelf-and the potential
and actual dangers to navigation and shipping. With the very close
proximity of Atlantis Group's project to the Florida coast and the USS
Taluga's attempt to anchor itself above an already sunken ship, the
United States' concerns are valid. While UNCLOS has since been
enacted, giving ratifying member states jurisdiction within 224
nautical miles of its borders, the United States would be less willing

122.
Id. at 36 n.130 (explaining the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' rejection of
the Taluga project).
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to interfere with or forbid the operations of TSI in the EEZ than
would the European nations.
Additionally, these cases speak to the issue of state sovereignty.
TSI is aware that within the United States' EEZ, the United States
would be able to exert control over the types of activities in which its
seasteads would engage. For this reason, the ultimate seasteads must
exist in international waters. Once the seasteads are in the high seas,
no state would be able to exercise jurisdictional control over them. 123
As discussed below,1 24 state sovereignty is essentially a sociopolitical
question of recognition by current states, and these four cases further
illustrate that the United States may categorically be willing to
recognize the seasteads as sovereign nations.

IV. SELF-DETERMINATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

The United Nations' treatment of self-determination has
transformed from a mere principle into a fundamental right of all
peoples. The United Nations thereafter outlined three ways in which
a group of peoples can attempt self-determination, and the seasteads
appropriately fit into the category of emergence as a sovereign
independent state. Since TSI hopes to build artificial islands in
international waters, seasteads will not involve secession from or
disruption to a current nation, which are traditional byproducts of
self-determination. The most challenging factor in determining
whether a community can become an independent state is its capacity
to enter into diplomatic relationships with currently existing
countries, but the only way to do so is if these nations recognize a
community as a country. Therefore, this circular criterion
underscores the conclusion that whether a group of peoples can
become sovereign hinges primarily on current countries' sociopolitical
choice of recognition.

A. The United Nations and Self-Determination
Self-determination is a fundamental pillar of the United Nations.
In its Founding Charter of 1945, the United Nations asserts its
devotion to "develop[ing] friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples."' 25 The Charter repeats the term "self-determination": the
United Nations shall act "with a view to the creation of conditions
and stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and

123.

See supra Part III.A.1 (covering freedom of the high seas provided for by

UNCLOS).
124.
125.

See infra Part IV (discussing self-determination and sovereignty).
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (emphasis added).

920

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:-899

friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples."126
Although the Charter appears to enshrine self-determination, it
explicitly states "rights and self-determination," and specifically not
the right of self-determination.1 27 If self-determination is not a right,
is it a principle? If it is merely a principle, is the United Nations
sincerely committed to this idea? To which "peoples" does the notion
of self-determination apply?' 2 8 These questions, which existed when
the United Nations was founded, were answered with the movement
to decolonize in the 1960s. During this era, the United Nations
shifted its philosophical paradigm away from the principle of selfdetermination-a "meager and tentative" foundation-and towards
an "an edifice of practice in which, increasingly, full external selfdetermination-preferably to result in independence-was viewed as
an imperative and immediate."129
UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960-the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoplescan be regarded as the beginning of this "revolutionary process."13 0
Resolution 1514 states that "[a]ll peoples have the right to selfdetermination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue economic, social, and cultural
development."' 3 1 Resolution 1514 also asserts that the "[s]ubjection of
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes
a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of
the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world
peace and co-operation."1 32 While Resolution 1514's title may lend
credence to the idea that self-determination applies only to colonized
people, the right as promulgated through the Resolution is applicable
to all; 'all peoples" have the right, not just colonized peoples.' 3 3
Specifically, Resolution 1514 "aims at a universal application of the
right of self-determination of all peoples, not just of all colonial
peoples."1 34
While Resolution 1514 began to develop the concept of selfdetermination, Resolution 1541 of the same year represents the
"culmination of an evolutionary" process in which the United Nations

126.
See id. art. 55. (emphasis added).
127.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. art. 1, para. 2 (providing rights and selfdetermination to be amongst the purposes of the United Nations).
128.
See id. art. 1, para. 2 (promising rights and self-determination "of peoples").
129.
MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE
NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 10 (1982).
Id. at 11.
130.

131.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 2, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960) (emphasis added).
132.
Id. 1 (emphasis added).
133.
See id. 1 2 (defining fundamental rights).
134.
JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF
MICRO-STATES: SELF-DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD 18 (1996).
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instructed its member states in determining whether a group of
peoples has appropriately attained self-determination.13 5 There are
three possible ways in which a community may do so:
(a)

Emergence as a sovereign independent State;

(b)

Free association with an independent State; or

(c)

13
Integration with an independent State.

6

The United - Nations has evolved the language of selfdetermination in two fundamental ways. The first is that selfdetermination has transformed into a right and not merely a
principle: Resolution 1514 explicitly replaces the "and" with a "to,"
enabling "the right to self-determination." 37 Secondly, the United
Nations qualifies the people to whom self-determination applies: to
"all peoples," as opposed to merely "peoples" in general. 138 These two
resolutions-1514 and 1541-have formed the bedrock of what some
dub the "New UN Law of Self-Determination." 139 Lastly, and of
particular pertinence to the TSI seasteads, the United Nations in
Resolution 2625 proclaims that "all peoples have the right freely to
determine,
without
external
interference,
their
political
status . . . and every State has the duty to respect this right in

accordance with the provisions of the Charter."140
The language of the UN Founding Charter and relevant
resolutions that followed suggest that TSI's hopes of selfdetermination are not in vain. Initially, self-determination was
merely a principle; yet, in response to the desire to free the colonized
world, the United Nations began to treat self-determination as a
right. Additionally, because this right was granted to "all" peoples
who are entitled to "freely determine . .. their political status," TSI
and its members are definitively included in those granted this
right.14 1 With this right, Resolution 1541 enumerates three options
for peoples similarly situated, and the first choice, "[e]mergence as a
sovereign independent State," is a viable option for TSI.142 As such,
the next logical obstacle is how the role of secession interacts with the
right of self-determination from the perspective of the United
Nations.

135.
See generally G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 2 (guiding in the
determination of territories "of the colonial type").
136.
See id. princ. VI (identifying methods of asserting self-determination).
137.
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 131.
138.
Id. (emphasis added).
139.
See POMERANCE, supra note 129, at 12 (noting the coinage used to describe
the two resolutions).
140.
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
141.
Id.
142.
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supranote 2, princ. VI.

922

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:899

B. The Right of Self-Determinationand Secession
Secession and disruption of the state are the inevitable byproducts of traditional self-determination.14 3 However, these two
notions appear to contradict directly with "another fundamental
principle of international law, namely with sovereignty," and in
particular, with the "territorial integrity" of state actors. 144 Indeed,
the United Nations illustrates this inconsistency. In Resolution 1514,
the United Nations upholds the notion of territorial integrity: "Any
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." 145 On
the other hand, in Resolution 2625, the United Nations confirms the
right to self-determination: "The establishment of a sovereign and
independent State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the
right of self-determination by that people."14 6 The language here
echoes with resounding clarity the three methods with which "all
peoples" can exercise their right of "self-determination" as articulated
in Resolution 1541.147
However, while secession and disruption of the state have
historically been the by-products of peoples seeking selfdetermination, TSI seasteading implicates neither of these issues
strictly. Secession can be thought to involve a group of peoples
wishing to claim the lands or territory of an existing country as its
own. Disruption can generally refer to an unusual interruption of the
regular activities of a nation's governmental system. TSI hopes to
establish, in its final form, artificial islands in international
waters,1 48 which are categorically not the territory of any nation. 149
Specifically, nations are unable to subject any part of the high seas to

143.
The United States most recently recognized Kosovo as a state in 2008, but
the country of Kosovo as it exists involved the secession from, and the disruption of, the
Serbian state. U.S., European Powers Recognize Kosovo, NBC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2008, 6:26
p.m.), http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/23219277/ns/world news-europe/t/us-european-powersrecognize-kosovoL.
144.
Dietrich Mursweik, The Issue of a Right of Secession-Reconsidered, in
MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 21, 22 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
145.
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 131, 6 (emphasis added).
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 140, at 124.
146.
147.
See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 131 (identifying the methods of
asserting self-determination).
148.
See supra Part I.B.1-2 (considering the motivations and goals of TSI
seasteading).
149.
See UNCLOS, supra note 9 (asserting that "the area of the sea-bed and
ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction ... are the
common heritage of mankind"); Geneva Convention, supra note 74, arts. 1-2 (defining
the "high seas" and their independence).
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their sovereignty.15 0 Therefore, were TSI seasteads to exist in
international waters, they would not be seceding from or disrupting
the United States-or any other member of the United Nations-in
the traditional sense.

C. Sovereignty
As an initial matter, the question of statehood is distinct from
that of membership into the United Nations.15 On the one hand,
recognition as a sovereignty is determined by the customary practice
of nations. On the other hand, membership in the United Nations is
facially a procedural process, beginning with a unanimous vote of
approval by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council,
on which the United States holds a seat.152 However, the United
States, as well as any other permanent member of the Security
Council, can veto membership to any potential member state for its
own reasons. Accordingly, whether the United States will recognize
TSI seasteads as sovereign states is a necessary precondition for
membership into the United Nations.
Although recognizing an independent sovereignty is largely a
decision that a nation makes detached from legal obligations, the
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 (the
Montevideo Convention) lists criteria that a group of people ought
have if the community hopes to be recognized as sovereign. The
Montevideo Convention states: "[T]he State as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a
permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d)
capacity to enter into relations with other states."i5 3 A population is
"an organization of human beings living together as a community,"
and the population of a state "compromises all individuals who, in

150.
See UNCLOS, supra note 9 (noting the need for a "legal order for the seas
and oceans" to govern the use of international waters); Geneva Convention, supra note
74, art. 2 ("[N]o State may validly purport to subject any part of [the high seas] to its
sovereignty.").
151.
It is possible for a member of the United Nations not to be a sovereign
state, as India was before it had fully realized full independence from the United
Kingdom; similarly, it is possible for a sovereign state not to be a member of the United
Nations (as Kosovo currently is). See generally John Cerone, The UN and the Status of
Palestine-Disentanglingthe Legal Issues, 15 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS, Sept. 13,
2011, available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insightll09l3.pdf.
152.
"Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters [other than purely
procedural matters] shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including
the concurring votes of the permanent members." U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. The
ICJ, in a 1950 Advisory Opinion, affirmed that the Security Council's recommendation
must be in favor of admission in order for a state to be admitted to membership by the
General Assembly. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State
to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 3).
153.
Montevideo Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
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principle, inhabit the territory in a permanent way."154 As much as
there is no minimum number of individuals that are necessary to
form a recognized state, there is no absolute minimum size for the
territory.155 Additionally, with regards to the territory, the borders do
not have to be strictly defined, despite the words of the Montevideo
Convention.' 5 6

D. Analysis
TSI's seasteads in their final form will easily meet the first three
requirements. TSI hopes that its communities will have permanent
populations-while a few individuals will necessarily have to travel
between seasteads and other nations, there is no reason to believe
that the communities would not be able to sustain permanent
populations.157 With regard to a defined territory, the structural
design of seasteads will satisfy this condition.' 5 8 Moreover, even its
modular design of moving neighborhoods 5 9 will not run afoul of the
territory requirement. Lastly, TSI envisions its seasteads as having
governments-this is the precise and motivating purpose of the
organization-and therefore the seasteads will comply with this third
standard.
The last criterion-the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations
with other states-invites a somewhat circular logic. For instance,
take aspiring state A and already existing state B. A and B can enter
into diplomatic relations only if B recognizes A as a state and invites
A into formal relations. In other words, the fourth requirement can be
reworded as to whether B recognizes A as a state. This ultimately
leads to the circular conclusion: in order for A to be recognized as a
state, it has to be able to enter into relations with other states, and in
order for A to have this capacity, it has to be recognized as a state.

154.
DUURSMA, supranote 134, at 18.
155.
See generally Kardol, supra note 79 (noting the lack of population
requirements). The Vatican, for example, has an estimated population of eight hundred
residents and a size of 0.2 square miles. Geography, VATICAN CITY ST.,
http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/vaticanstate/en/stato-e-governo/note-generali/
geografia.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013); Population, VATICAN CITY ST.,
http://www.vaticanstate.valcontent/vaticanstate/en/stato-e-governo/note-generali/
popolazione.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013). And of the eight hundred residents, the
vast majority are not permanent residents of this confined area. Population,supra.
156.
See Kardol, supra note 5_(noting that "absolute certainty. . . is not
required," despite the Montevideo Convention's qualifications).
157.
See FAQ, supra note 29 (responding to frequently asked questions about
the viability of seasteads).
158.
This modular design is meant to further experiment with social living so
that no one neighborhood remains static. See supra note 55 (explaining the structure of
seasteads).
159.
See supra note 54 (explaining the structure of seasteads); supra note 154
and accompanying text (explaining that under the requirements for statehood, borders
do not need to be strictly defined).
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This circularity highlights the importance of currently existing
nations' choice of recognition as the dispositive factor.

V. RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS
Examples of the modern era indicate whether the United States
and, as a corollary, the United Nations, will recognize TSI
communities as independent nations. As a recent example, the
sovereign nation of Kosovo is particularly illustrative because the
United States has chosen to recognize the country, 160 whereas the
United Nations has declined to follow suit. 6 1 As previously
mentioned, whether the United States accepts TSI's seasteads is a
necessary precondition to acceptance by the United Nations. 6 2 The
divergence of the opinion regarding Kosovo is a useful analogy in
concluding that the United States most likely will recognize the TSI
seasteads.

A. The United States and Recognition of Kosovo
In 2009, the United States responded to the UN General
Assembly for an advisory opinion on the "Accordance with
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo." The United States
strongly encouraged the United Nations to recognize Kosovo as a
nation, concluding that Kosovo's declaration of independence was in
accordance with international law.163
The United States posits that international law does not,
generally speaking, regulate declarations of independence.1 64 The
United States notes that the Charter of the United Nations, other
international agreements, and customary international law all do not

160.
See generally United States Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State,
AMERICA.GOV (Feb. 18, 2008),
http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-englishl2008/
February/20080218144244dmslahrellekO.9832117.html (discussing U.S. acceptance of
Kosovo's declaration of independence).
161.
See generally Nicholas Kulish & C.J. Chivers, Kosovo Is Recognized but
Rebuked by Others, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/
worldleurope/19kosovo.html?pagewanted=all.
162.
See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (noting the role of the
United States and the United Nations in confirming the legitimacy of seasteads as
sovereign states).
163.
See generally U.S. Dep't of State, Written Statement of the United States of
America, Request for Advisory Opinion on the Question of the Accordance with
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, transmitted by letter dated Apr. 17, 2009
from the U.S. Acting Legal Advisor to the Registrar of the Int'l Court of Justice (April
2009) (presenting the U.S. position with regard to Kosovo's declaration of independence
from Serbia).
164.
See id. at 50 (characterizing international law).
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police these declarations. 16 5 The United States rationalizes that
international law governs relations among states, and communities
hoping to establish independence are categorically not states. 166 As
such, declarations must therefore be in "accordance with
international law."' 6 7
The United States further proclaims that the "process of state
formation presents a matter of fact," as opposed to a question of
law.168 While "other events associated with a particular declaration of
independence" may very well come within the ambit of international
law, the declaration itself is a matter of fact: a declaration is "a fact
that precedes the law, and which the law acknowledges only once it
has materialised, by attributing certain effects to it, including a
certain legal status."'6 9
However, the nature of these "other events" may prove
dispositive in the final legitimacy of declarations of independence. On
the one hand, a declaration of independence violating domestic law,
such as a "rebel regime attempting to overthrow the government of
the state or to secede from the state,"1 70 does not indicate that such a
declaration necessarily violates international law. On the other hand,
when a declaration of independence violates international laws-such
as the attempt to establish an apartheid regime-the declaration will
be considered unlawful by international standards.171
Moreover, the United States believes that the concept of
territorial integrity does not preclude a declaration of
independence.1 72 This principle is only important when considering
the actions and "conduct of states."1 73 The United States notes that
all the treatises that Serbia (an opponent of Kosovo's independence)
cites in favor of finding that Kosovo has violated territorial integrity
in fact confirm that territorial integrity "applies [only] as between
states."174 The United States concludes, "[N]o rule of international
law would prohibit non-state actors from declaring independence." 75

See id. (characterizing international law).
165.
166.
See id. at 50-51. The United States notes that there are certain exceptions,
such as those found in international humanitarian law; however, "declarations of
independence do not by themselves fall into these exceptions." Id.
See id. at 50 (suggesting that nothing in Kosovo's declaration would not be
167.
"in accordance with international law").
168.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 52 (quoting GEORGES ABI-SAAB, Conclusion to SECESSION:
169.
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 470).
170.
Id. at 51 (quoting OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW

§ 49

(9th ed. 1992)).

See id. at 56 (discussing acts of independence that constitute "serious
171.
international law violations").
See id. at 69 (considering the relationship between territorial integrity and
172.
statehood creation).
See id. (noting relevance).
173.
174.

Id.

175.

See id. (reaffirming the United States' rejection of Serbia's arguments).
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Consistent with these ideas, declarations of independence are
matters of fact and presumptively allowed; accordingly, the United
States looked to whether there were surrounding circumstances that
would render Kosovo's declaration in violation of international law.176
Finding none, the United States instead deemed certain provisions of
the declaration to be "consistent" with international lawparticularly, Kosovo's emphasis on human rights.177 Ultimately, the
United States believed that Kosovo's declaration of independence was
in accordance with international law, and thus that the United
Nations should follow suit and recognize Kosovo.178
B. The InternationalCourt of Justice's Commitment
to Recognizing Kosovo
In 2010, the ICJ concurred with the United States, advising that
Kosovo should be recognized as a nation by the United Nations. The
ICJ similarly held that the general body of international law does not
actively prohibit declarations of independence. 79 Accordingly, the
ICJ stated that Kosovo's declaration of independence as a preliminary
matter, in and of itself, does not violate international law.180 From
here, the ICJ agreed with the United States in that, within the
framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo's
declaration is not in violation of international law.
The ICJ characterized Resolution 1244's purposes as resolving
the "grave humanitarian situation" of the Yugoslavian area. 181 The
ICJ noted that there are three unique features of Resolution 1244
relevant to determining its object and purpose regarding Kosovo's
status. 8 2 The first was the establishment of "an international civil
and security presence in Kosovo," with untethered authority and
autonomous responsibility for governing Kosovo,' 8 3 and this
governing body would be titled the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The second was
recognizing that the purpose of UNMIK's presence was humanitarian
in nature and specifically, to reestablish "basic public order" and to

176.
See id. at 56 (considering acts of independence that may constitute "serious
international law violations").
177.
See id. (asserting the legitimacy of Kosovo's declaration of independence).
178.
See id. (noting the declaration's conformance with the highest
"international human rights protections").
179.
See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 1 84 (Jul. 22)
(confirming general international law).
180.
See id. (summarizing the court's holding in paragraph 84).
181.
Id. 58 (quoting the Security Council's resolution).
182.
See id. 96 (following the court's initial reasoning).
183.
See id. 97 (quoting the ICJ's interpretation of Security Council Resolution
1244).
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stabilize the region.184 The United Nations envisioned that these
goals would be achieved through a four-pronged approach-the socalled four pillars of an "interim civil administration, humanitarian
affairs, institution building, and reconstruction."s8 5 Thirdly, the
regime established by Resolution 1244 was temporary and did not
"put[] in place a permanent institutional framework [within]
Kosovo." 8 6
The ICJ found that the declaration of independence did not
violate Resolution 1244. Resolution 1244 was designed to create
UNMIK, an interim regime, with the pursuit of "channeling the longterm political process to establish [the area's] final status." 8 7
However, even though Resolution 1244 had this goal in mind, it did
not contain any provision that dealt with Kosovo's final status or how
the community would achieve this. 8 8 Alternatively, Kosovo's
declaration of independence was an attempt to determine this final
status. 8 9 The ICJ saw this disparity merely as "operat[ing] on a
different level," and as such, found that the declaration did not
violate Resolution 1244.
C. Analysis
A trajectory from the United States' response in the 1960s to
Atlantis Group and the USS Abalonia, combined with the position the
United States held with respect to Kosovo's declaration of
independence, suggests that the United States would be willing to
recognize and accept TSI seasteads as sovereign entities existing in
international waters. Looking solely at the two situations in the
1960s, the United States appeared more concerned with controlling
its territorial waters than with restricting the activities conducted
there. The United States was able to control Atlantis Group and the
USS Abalonia because they were within its jurisdictional waters and
therefore prohibited them for navigation-safety purposes.1 90 On the
other hand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom dismantled
pirate radio stations operating in international waters precisely in an
effort to control behavior against the mores of both nations, but
responding in somewhat different ways: the Netherlands created laws
that retroactively applied and made these stations illegal, and the
United Kingdom took a loss formidable but equally indicative

184.
185.
186.
regime).
187.
188.
189.
1244).
190.

See id. 98 (noting the goals of Resolution 1244).
Id. $ 98; accord 1 60.
See id. T 99 (quoting the court's assertion of the temporary nature of the
Id. 1 114 (quoting the court's interpretation of Resolution 1244's intent).
See id. (highlighting the court's observation of the problem).
See id. (distinguishing the Declaration of Independence from Resolution
See supra Part III.A.2.
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approach, by encouraging the European community as a whole to
enact similar laws.19'
Given the United States' response to Kosovo's petition for
independence and the current gaps in international law regulating
nonstate actors in international seas, TSI seasteads would most likely
be recognized by the United States. The international law of seas
promulgated by the United Nations governs the relationships
between state actors alone; as such, the activities of the seasteads in
international waters as private citizens are not explicitly
prohibited.192 If the United States determines that, because
declarations of independence are not prohibited, they therefore are
allowed, then there is no reason why the seasteads petitioning for
independence would be deemed a violation of international law. If
TSI's communities do not violate international law, then their
declaration of independence would not encounter obstacles. The
seasteads would be wise to incorporate in its declaration that the
notions of state sovereignty and self-determination are paramount,
much like Kosovo did with respect to humanitarian law. The United
States
found that Kosovo's
declaration,
because
of its
acknowledgement to adhere to the principles of international
humanitarian law, was not only not in violation of international law,
but also affirmatively in accordance.1 93 As a result, if the seasteads'
declaration of independence acknowledges and adheres to selfdetermination and sovereignty, then the United States' recognition
will be based on their conforming to international law.
The ICJ looked to see whether Kosovo's declaration of
independence violated Resolution 1244 and determined that the two
are not in conflict with each other. Resolution 1244 was enacted by
the United Nations in response to the political situation surrounding
the Yugoslavian area; with respect to seasteads, however, there has
been no UN resolution regarding the use or control of international
waters by private citizens. Because of this legal gap, the seasteads'
declaration of independence could not violate international law, and
therefore would be more likely to be accepted by other members in
the international community.

VI. CONCLUSION

Despite the obvious structural and financial obstacles that may
be prohibitive, the seastead communities as envisioned by the TSI
encounter various issues of international law. With regards to the law

191.
See Part III.A.2.
192.
See supra Part III.A.1.
193.
See supra Part V.A (considering the stance of the United States on
statehood recognition).
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of the seas, the activities of TSI as a nonstate actor are not be
prohibited. However, this results because the laws promulgated by
the United Nations deal primarily with the interactions among
states. Even if, arguendo a lack of prohibition constitutes an implicit
allowance, it appears that TSI may exist as a private, nonstate actor
in international waters if it so desires.
However, TSI will not stop there: the organization hopes to
create nations, for the purpose of experimenting with social norms
and governmental structures. In order to do so, and in particular, to
compete with currently existing forms of government, TSI's
communities need to be recognized as nations. The only way that the
choice-of-government regime , will necessarily work is if the
communities are sovereign states. Individuals can choose between
competing legal regimes only if both-for instance, that of the United
States and that of the TSI seastead-exist independent of one
another. For these reasons, TSI will inevitably continue to pursue
independence.
Whether or not a community is recognized as a sovereignty is by
and large a sociopolitical question and not a legal one: other nations
may choose to recognize a group of people as independent, and no
country is legally obliged to do so. Whether TSI will succeed in this
endeavor illuminates several gaps in international law of state
sovereignty and self-determination. Equally important is the
seasteads' unique means of achieving independence: instead of
seceding from a currently existing country, TSI wants to build its own
countries in international waters. The body of international law does
not facially govern this; however, because the law is not dispositive as
to whether a country is recognized, the most informative tool is
historical state practice.
This Note concludes that the United States would most likely
come to recognize a TSI seastead community as a sovereign state.
Based on its interactions with attempts to create artificial islands
within its jurisdiction, the United States seems more concerned with
nonstate actors taking what belongs to the United States than in
regulating the activities of these communities from a normative
standpoint. Moreover, the United States, through its acceptance and
recognition of Kosovo, has indicated that unless declarations of
independence are connected with events or conditions that violate
international law, they are, as a matter of fact, valid. Here, TSI's
actions will not violate international law, and its declaration of
independence should enshrine the values of self-determination and
sovereignty to verify its adherence to international law.
Despite these guiding doctrines, whether the United States will
recognize the seastead communities is admittedly uncertain, and
therefore membership into the United Nations is equally unclear.
Normatively speaking, this Note holds that current nation-states
should be willing to accept and recognize the seastead communities,
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precisely because of their choice-of-government purpose. If people are
content with the status quo of their governments, then seasteading
will cease to exist because no one will seek out new forms of
government. On the other hand, if people are dissatisfied with their
respective governments, as the members of TSI are, then having the
seasteads as an outlet for experimentation can be a fruitful exercise
in political-thought processes and should be encouraged for two
worthy reasons. First, the alternative is undesirable: a disgruntled
body-albeit a minority-of citizens that may gain enough traction to
attempt internal revolt or secession. Secondly, and more importantly,
these incubators of political experiment could very well lead to the
betterment of governmental systems and countries as they exist
today. If citizens leave their respective countries for seastead
communities that are recognized and operate as sovereign states, this
will force their abandoned nations to compete with the seasteads. In
other words, nations will strive to refashion their governments in a
manner to maintain their citizenry. If countries are able to develop
new or better forms of government that are attractive to both the
malcontented as well as the satisfied citizenry, then this logically
would lead to the most socially desirable political systems. Whether
seasteading as envisioned by TSI will ever come into fruition, or stay
in existence, is ultimately dependent on a plethora of factors that are
not directly related to the goal of political experimentation. However,
it is precisely because of this goal that today's society should not only
hope that seasteading becomes a reality, but also actively promote its
realization: seasteading is a' Darwinian choice-of-legal-regime
competition that could very well result in the most efficient
international community of nations.

Ryan H. Fateh*

Ryan H. Fateh, Candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence 2013, Vanderbilt
University Law School; B.A. 2009, Columbia University. The author extends his
sincere gratitude to the members of the editorial staff at the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law for their collaborative efforts and dedication, as well as to his
family and friends for their unwavering patience and support.

